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I. INTRODUCTION: WEBSTER AND THE ART OF SPIN CONTROL
"Spin doctors," as they came to be known in the last presidential
campaign, practice a not-so-fine art of press manipulation. The goal
is generally to make bad news hurt less (e.g., "third in Iowa, my God,
we're delighted; it's a springboard for New Hampshire!") and good
news help more (e.g., "the real test will be in... [pick state where
you've already spent twice as much as the opposition]"). The press
generally knows the doctors are working ("what's your spin?" or
"spin me" the reporters say), but the process works anyway, particu-
larly if the spinners can look appropriate in the end (e.g., "aides were
plainly pleased with their candidates third place finish .... ").
Lawyers, of course, have been "spinning" judicial decisions for
years. In court, it's called advocacy. Rarely, though, has a court
decision been "spun" as forcefully and effectively as the United
States Supreme Court's decision last Term in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.' The spin was, surprisingly, the same on both sides.
The right-to-lifers said victory was at hand. The pro-choicers said
the sky was falling.
What was most surprising about this, at least at first glance, was
that it bore almost no relation to what had actually been decided in
Webster. Which was, according to all sides of the Court, at least, not
much. As Justice Blackmun put it, "[flor today, at least, the law of
abortion stands undisturbed." 2 Or as Justice Scalia wrote, with obvi-
ous scorn, the Court, and Justice O'Connor in particular, succeeded
in their determination "to avoid almost any decision of national
import."3
As the Court construed them, Webster's three particular issues fit
well within previous regulations upheld by the Court. The majority
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1974, Wellesley College; J.D.
1977, Harvard University.
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1978, Oxford University; J.D. 1981, Harvard University.
1 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2 Id. at 3079 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
S Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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was able to avoid any ruling at all on Missouri's declaration that life
begins at conception by concluding that the passage merely
expressed a value judgment. Restrictions on using public facilities
for abortion, particularly as narrowly although perhaps inaccurately
framed by the state's Attorney General, fit within the Court's prece-
dents upholding the exclusion of public support for abortion.
Finally, the state's seeming viability testing requirement at twenty
weeks or more became, with a little interpretive twisting, no more
than a recommendation that doctors perform such tests where medi-
cally appropriate.
Of course, if little was decided in Webster, a good deal was none-
theless said. The Chief Justice, writing for three members of the
Court, made plain that he was ready to jettison Roe trimester
approach of Roe v. Wade,4 presumably finding the state's interest in
potential life as compelling in the first month as the last, and leaving
it to the state to balance its own interest against the woman's, subject
only to some rationality review. The genius of the approach, if you
can call it that, is that it effectively overrules Roe without ever even
suggesting that a woman lacks a privacy or autonomy interest in her
own body.
From the looks of things, the approach was crafted with the
hopes of winning five votes for an opinion that would have more
than earned all the hoopla that Webster garnered. Justice O'Connor,
however, was more stubborn than many expected or dared hope.
While voting to uphold the regulations, as she always has in abortion
cases, she refused to seize the opportunity to review anything
broader than the statute before her: "When the constitutional inva-
lidity of a State's abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional
validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe.
And to do so carefully."
5
Justice Scalia, who recognized that Chief Justice Rehnquist's
approach would effectively overrule Roe, but preferred to do so
"more explicitly," ridiculed Justice O'Connor's self-described efforts
at "statesmanship." He pointed out each of her opinions from this
Term that in fact "formulate[d] a rule of constitutional law broader
than required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied" 6-
precisely what she refused to do here.
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
6 Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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All of this left the abortion question, unfortunately, pretty much
where most sophisticated Court-watchers (did anyone really doubt
how Justice Kennedy would vote) thought it would be: with four firm
votes to reaffirm and four poised to eviscerate Roe, but with Justice
O'Connor more resistant to that onslaught than many of us dared
hope. Not good news, to be sure, particularly considering the dis-
senters' average age and last November's election results, but was
the sky falling? Or rather, were things any worse than they had been
a day or a week or six months before?
The right-to-lifers plainly had every incentive to claim a major
victory in Webster; it's the old strategy of making basically good or at
least O.K. news help more: keeping that "Big Mo" rolling as our
President used to say. The pro-choice strategy was a little different.
Conventional wisdom usually advises downplaying your defeats: the
"more of the same" and "the big test is still ahead, nothing new here
folks" line. For the pro-choice movement, though, these are not
conventional times.
Long outflanked, in terms of outward signs of energy, command
of the debate, and fear inspired in politicians, the pro-choice forces
had fastened on Webster as a rallying point. The United States gov-
ernment's much-publicized decision to use Webster as an occasion to
challenge Roe was the spark. The chances of the government actually
succeeding were, to be sure, slim. The government had tried pre-
cisely the same strategy before, and even after Justice Kennedy's
appointment, it was likely one vote short.7 Still, and for the first
time, pro-choice voters were shedding their complacency.
All of these factors presented the pro-choice side with an obvi-
ous opportunity, but also a real danger. The danger was, quite sim-
ply, that a decision like Webster would lead the newly or about-to-be
activated to conclude that the past months' political efforts had been
so much ado about nothing. The July 3rd "spin" plainly avoided
that danger. The losers, like the winners, described Webster as a
major turning point. Both sides were saying the same thing, albeit
for different reasons. And when that happens, the spin is the news.
For better or worse- and we think and hope, for the better-Ameri-
can politics may never be quite the same. The abortion issue is on
the table. The great, silent majority that is pro-choice, or at least
7 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1985) (No. 84-495).
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anti-government, has been scared into action. All by a Supreme
Court case that decided nothing at all.
There are, to be sure, some dangers to this strategy. The most
serious is that people who should know better might actually believe
the hype. Legislators who have been happily hiding behind the
Supreme Court and "the law of the land" have lost their cover, if not
because of the Supreme Court's actions, then because of the coun-
try's perception. Governors seem to think that Webster justifies spe-
cial legislative sessions to restrict abortion rights. And worst of all,
some judges may mistake the hoopla for precedent and conclude
that the televised analyses, particularly by law professors, should be
the basis for their opinions.
Still, from a. political point of view, the choice seems clearly
right. Complicated arguments about pluralities, concurrences,
undue burdens, and strict scrutiny are hardly the stuff of political
debate. The language of politics is very different from the language
of law; and if anyone still doubts that, ask them whether we should
require schoolteachers to lead the pledge of allegiance in class, or
whether we should give murderers weekend furloughs. The decision
to move into the political debate, and to do so with a cry of alarm if
not desperation, fairly reflects the fact that the pro-choice position
can no longer routinely command a majority of the Supreme Court.
We knew that before Webster. It just provided the opportunity to say
so loudly.
But that does not mean that it is time to abandon the Court. We
cannot afford to. That is the very point that pro-choice advocates
have been making in the Court for most of the last twenty years:
even if we are better organized now, leaving these decisions to state
legislatures, means that some women will lose their rights. The abil-
ity to choose will once again depend upon who you are and where
you live and how much money you have; and young and poor
women, for whom the burden of an unwanted pregnancy is most
crushing, will have the fewest rights of all. The bottom line isn't
spin; and we forget it at our peril.
And so we will return to the Supreme Court, this Term and no
doubt next and the one after, and notwithstanding what our col-
leagues said on television, we will say that Webster decided nothing at
all.
But it certainly did make one thing clear: eight men may read
our briefs, but the real audience is one woman. Sandra Day
O'Connor, the only woman in American history to sit on the United
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States Supreme Court, is in the position single-handedly to decide
the future of abortion rights.
This Article is not an effort to "spin" anyone. It is nothing more
or less than our best try, using whatever legal and persuasive talents
we have, to convince an audience of one to stand up to those who are
turning their backs on women.
Where exactly does Justice O'Connor hold the cards? In the
streets, the dispute takes blunt form: to some demonstrators, abor-
tion is murder; to others, no women should ever wind up in the back
alley again. In court, the debate is more refined. Three basic issues
divide the post-Roe Court. The first is whether there is an underlying
fundamental right to choose abortion. The second is what counts as
government infringement of that right. The third is when such
infringement may bejustified. After Roe, controversy swirled around
the first. After Webster, the first has been eclipsed by the second and
third. And it is on the second and third issues that Justice
O'Connor's is the pivotal vote.
II. THE EXISTENCE OF A LIBERTY INTEREST
Roe v. Wade held the "right of privacy ... founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action.... broad enough to encompass a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 8 That recognition
appears, sixteen years later, far less controversial than it did at the
time. The most recent efforts to eviscerate Roe, most notably the
Chief Justice's opinion in Webster, do not deny the liberty interest's
existence, but rather effectively deny the court's obligation to protect
it with strict scrutiny.9
8 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
9 The Chief Justice and Justice White have previously disputed Roe's premise
that a woman's right to control pregnancy is fundamental. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-
73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that even if there were a "liberty" interest of
persons to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions, "that
liberty" is guaranteed "only against deprivation without due process of law; [t]he test
traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not a
law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid state objective."); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) ("I cannot accept the Court's
exercise of its clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state
efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers and doctors with the
Constitutionally protected right to exterminate it."); Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("I can certainly agree with the proposition ... that a woman's ability to
choose an abortion is a species of 'liberty' that is subject to the general protections of
the Due Process Clause. I cannot agree, however, that this liberty is so 'fundamental'
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Still, it seems important, at the outset, to revisit the casefor Roe's
recognition of a fundamental liberty interest.10 If the Roe analysis is
now accepted wisdom, as it appears and should be, then the
onslaught on the scrutiny question becomes even more clearly hypo-
critical. Standard constitutional practice requires applying strict
scrutiny to government restrictions on fundamental rights. 1
that restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the most minimal judicial
scrutiny."), but only Justice Scalia took that route in Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064-67
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (staunchly advocating re-
examining Roe).
10 A number of commentators have also argued persuasively that abortion
restrictions discriminate on the basis of gender, and that heightened scrutiny ought
be applied on that basis as well. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REV. 375 (1985); Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). One might think that Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), precludes this argument. Geduldig upheld a state
disability insurance program that excluded from coverage certain disabilities
resulting from pregnancy. The Court reasoned that excluding "pregnant women"
from benefits accruing to "nonpregnant persons" was not a gender-based
classification. Id. at 496-97 n.20. The Geduldig program, however, is distinguishable
from abortion restrictions along lines that now-ChiefJustice Rehnquist drew shortly
afterward. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977) (deeming
exclusion of pregnant employees sex discrimination under Title VII), then-Justice
Rehnquist drew a distinction between "merely refus[ing] to extend to women a
benefit that men cannot and do not receive," as in Geduldig, and "impos[ing] on
women a substantial burden that men need not suffer," as in Satty. Although this
distinction between non-benefits and burdens is misconceived, it at least suggests
that Geduldig does not bar heightened scrutiny of abortion restrictions as sex
discrimination. On this theory, abortion restrictions constitute sex-based
classifications no less than would a law forbidding pregnant women to appear in
public. Cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974)
(invalidating under the due process clause a school board regulation that required
pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave five months before
childbirth); see id. at 651-53 (Powell, J., concurring on equal protection grounds).
Moreover, the "fundamental rights" branch of the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence suggests that not only heightened, but strict scrutiny would be
necessary. Where legislatures classify in a way that imposes unequal burdens on
basic interests in bodily integrity, procreation, health, and family, the Court has held
such classifications subject to strict review. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to a
compulsory sterilization law that discriminated among categories of criminals, a kind
of line-drawing that otherwise would not have been suspect); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to a
marriage restriction that discriminated against persons with outstanding child
support obligations, a classification that would normally have been deferentially
reviewed).
II This section draws heavily from an amicus curiae brief we prepared on behalf
of various groups in Turnock v. Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir, 1988), cert. granted,
57 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. July 3, 1989), and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, prob. jurisdiction noted, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989), two of the abortion cases
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A. Reproductive Choice is Essential to a Woman's Control of Her Destiny
and Family Life
Notwithstanding the abortion controversy, the Supreme Court
has long acknowledged an unenumerated right to privacy as a spe-
cies of "liberty" that the due process clauses protect.1 2 The princi-
ple is as ancient as Meyer v. Nebraska 3 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1
4
which protected parents' freedom to educate their children free of
the state's controlling hand. In its modem elaboration, this right
continues to protect child rearing and family life from the overly
intrusive reach of government.' 5 The modem privacy cases have
also plainly established that. decisions whether to bear children are
no less fundamental than decisions about how to raise them. The
Court has consistently held since Griswold v. Connecticut 16 that the
Constitution accords special protection to "matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,"
and has therefore strictly scrutinized laws restricting contracep-
tion.17 Roe held that these principles extend no less to abortion than
to contraception.
The privacy cases rest, as Justice Stevens recognized in Thorn-
burgh, centrally on "'the moral fact that a person belongs to himself
[or herself] and not others nor to society as a whole.' "18 Extending
this principle to the abortion decision follows from the fact that
"[flew decisions are ... more basic to individual dignity and auto-
pending in the United States Supreme Court at the outset of the current term.
Ragsdale has since settled.
12 The right of privacy is only one among many instances in which the Court has
recognized rights that are not expressly named in the Constitution's text. To name
just a few other examples, the Court has recognized unenumerated rights to freedom
of association, see National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); to equal protection under the fifth aiendment
due process clause, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); to travel between
the states, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1966); to vote, see Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 554 (1964); and to attend criminal trials, see Richmond Newspapers Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980).
13 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (noting a constitutional right to live with one's grandchildren);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (affirming a right to interracial marriage).
16 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
18 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 777 n.5 (1985) (StevensJ., concurring) (quoting former Solicitor General Fried,
Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288-89 (1977)).
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nomy" or more appropriate to the "private sphere of individual lib-
erty" than the uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision
whether or not to continue a pregnancy.'
In two senses, abortion restrictions keep a woman from
"belonging to herself." First and most obviously, they deprive her of
bodily self-possession. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in
another context, pregnancy entails "profound physical, emotional,
and psychological consequences."-20 To name a few, pregnancy
increases a woman's uterine size 500-1000 times, her pulse rate by
ten to fifteen beats a minute, and her body weight by 25 pounds or
more.2' Even the healthiest pregnancy can entail nausea, vomiting,
more frequent urination, fatigue, back pain, labored breathing, or
water retention. 22 There are also numerous medical risks involved
in carrying pregnancy to term: of every ten women who experience
pregnancy and childbirth, six need treatment for some medical com-
plication, and three need treatment for major complications. 21 In
addition, labor and delivery impose extraordinary physical demands,
whether over the six to twelve hour or longer course of vaginal deliv-
ery, or during the highly invasive surgery involved in a cesarean sec-
tion, which accounts for one out of four deliveries.
2 4
By compelling pregnancy to term and delivery even where they
are unwanted, abortion restrictions thus exert far more profound
intrusions into bodily integrity than the stomach-pumping the Court
invalidated in Rochin v. California, 25 or the surgical removal of a bullet
from a shoulder that the Court invalidated in Winston v. Lee.26 "The
integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our soci-
ety''27 because it is so essential to identity; as former Solicitor Gen-
eral Charles Fried, who argued for the United States in Webster,
19 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
20 Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 480 U.S. 464, 471 (1981).
21 SeeJ. PRITCHARD, P. McDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 181-210,
260-63 (17th ed. 1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS].
22 See id.
23 See R. GOLD, A. KENNEY & S. SINGH, BLESSED EVENTS AND THE BOTrOM LINE:
FINANCING MATERNITY CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1987).
24 See D. DANFORTH, M. HUGHEY & A. WAGNER, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
PREGNANCY 228-31 (1983); S. ROMNEY, MJ. GRAY, A.B. LITTLE, J. MERRILL, EJ.
QUILLIGAN & R. STANDER, GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS: THE HEALTH CARE OF
WOMEN 626-37 (2d ed. 1981).
25 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
26 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
27 Id. at 760.
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recognized in another context: "[to say] that my body can be used is
[to say] that I can be used." 28
These points would be too obvious to require restatement if the
state attempted to compel abortions rather than to restrict them.
Indeed, in colloquy with Justice O'Connor during the Webster oral
argument, former Solicitor General Fried conceded that in such a
case, liberty principles, although unenumerated, would compel the
strictest review. To be sure, as Mr. Fried suggested, restrictive abor-
tion laws do not literally involve "laying hands on a woman." 29 But
this distinction should make no difference: the state would plainly
infringe its citizens' bodily integrity whether its agents inflicted knife
wounds or its laws forbade surgery or restricted blood transfusions
in cases of private knifings.a
0
Apart from this impact on bodily integrity, abortion restrictions
infringe S woman's autonomy in a second sense as well; they invade
the autonomy in family affairs that the Supreme Court has long
deemed central to the right of privacy. Liberty requires indepen-
dence in making the most important decisions in life."1 "The deci-
sion whether or not to beget or bear a child" lies at "the very heart of
this cluster of constitutionally protected choices," '3 2 because few
decisions can more importantly alter the course of one's life than the
decision to bring a child into the world. Bearing a child dramatically
affects " 'what a person is, what [s]he wants, the determination of
[her] life plan, of [her] concept of the good' " and every other aspect
of the " 'self-determination ... [that] give[s] substance to the con-
cept of liberty.' -33 Becoming a parent dramatically alters a woman's
educational prospects, 4 employment opportunities, 5 and sense of
28 C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 121 n.* (1978).
29 Transcript of Oral Argument in Abortion Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at B12,
col. 5.
30 Likewise, a state would surely infringe reproductive freedom by compelling
abortions even if it became technologically possible to do so without "laying hands
on a woman."
31 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
32 Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
33 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 777 n.5 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG
146-47 (1978)).
34 Teenage mothers have high dropout rates: eight out of ten who become
mothers at age seventeen or younger do not finish high school. See Fielding,
Adolescent Pregnancy Revisited, 299 Mass. Dep't Pub. Health 893, 894 (1978).
35 Control over the rate of childbirth is a key factor in explaining recent gains in
women's wages relative to men's. See Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 25, 33-37 (1989).
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self.3 6 In light of these elemental facts, it is no surprise that the free-
dom to choose one's own family formations is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."
37
Today, virtually no one disputes that these principles require
heightened scrutiny of laws restricting access to contraception.3 8
But critics of Roe sometimes argue that abortion is "different in kind
from the decision not to conceive in the first place."39 Justice White,
for example, has asserted that, while the liberty interest is fundamen-
tal in the contraception context, 4° that interest falls to minimal after
41conception.
Such a distinction cannot stand, however, because no bright line
can be drawn between contraception and abortion in light of modern
scientific and medical advances. Contraception and abortion are
points on a continuum. Even "conception" itself is a complex pro-
cess of which fertilization is simply the first stage. According to con-
temporary medical authorities, conception begins not with
fertilization, but rather six to seven days later when the fertilized egg
becomes implanted in the uterine wall, itself a complex process.42
Many medically accepted contraceptives operate after fertilization.
For example, both oral contraceptives and the intra-uterine device
36 This fact is evident even if the biological mother does not raise her child.
Relinquishing a child for adoption may alleviate material hardship, but it is
psychologically traumatic. See Winkler & VanKeppel, Relinquishing Mothers in Adoption:
Their Long-Term Adjustment, Monograph No. 3, Institute of Family Studies (1984).
37 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
3s The United States has conceded before the Supreme Court that the Griswold
line of cases was correctly decided. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants, 11-13, Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 1109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989) (No. 88-605); Transcript of OralArgument in Abortion Case, N.Y. Times, Apr.
27, 1989, at B13, col. 1 (Argument of former Solicitor General Fried on behalf of the
United States).
39 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
40 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1972) (White, J., concurring in
result); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (WhiteJ., concurring
in judgment).
41 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
fetus' presence after conception changes not merely the state justification but "the
characterization of the liberty interest itself").
42 See WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 21, at 88-91; Milby, The New Biology and
the Question ofPersonhood: Implications for Abortion, 9 AM.J.L. & MED. 31, 39-41 (1983).
Indeed, the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, the pre-eminent
authority on such matters, has adopted the following official definition of conception:
conception consists of "the implantation of the blastocyst [fertilized ovum]" in the
uterus, and thus is "not synonymous with fertilization." OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC
TERMINOLOGY 229, 327 (E. Hughes ed. 1972). Such a definition is not surprising in
view of the fact that less than half of fertilized ova ever successfully become
implanted. See Post-Coital Contraception, I THE LANCET 855, 856 (1983).
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(IUD) not only prevent fertilization but in some instances prevent
implantation.4" Moreover, the most significant new developments in
contraceptive technology, such as RU486, act by foiling implanta-
tion.44 All such contraceptives blur the line between contraception
and abortion.
In the absence of a bright physiological line, there can be no
bright constitutional line between the moments before and after con-
ception. A woman's fundamental liberty does not simply evaporate
when sperm meets ovum. Indeed, as Justice Stevens has recognized,
"if one decision is more 'fundamental' to the individual'si freedom
than the other, surely it is the postconception decision that is the
more serious." 4 5 Saying this much does not deny that profound evo-
lutionary changes occur between fertilization and birth. Clearly,
there is some difference between "the freshly fertilized egg and...
the 9-month-gestated ... fetus on the eve of birth.",4 6 But as Roe v.
Wade fully recognized, such differences go at most to the weight of
the state's justification for interfering with a pregnancy; they do not
extinguish the underlying fundamental liberty.
Thus Roe is not a mere "thread" that the Court could pull with-
out "unravel[ing]" the now elaborately woven "fabric" of the privacy
decisions.4 7 Rather, Roe is integral to the principle that childbearing
decisions come to "th[e] Court with a momentum for respect that is
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements. ' 48  The decision to become a
mother is too fundamental to be equated with the decision to buy a
car, choose optometry over ophthalmology, take early retirement, or
43 See R. HATCHER, E. GUEST, F. STEWART, G. STEWARTJ. TRUSSELL, S. BOWEN &
W. CATES, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 252-53, 377 (14th rev. ed. 1988)
[hereinafter CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY]; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, IUDs: GUIDELINES FOR INFORMED DECISION-MAKING AND USE
(1987).
44 See CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 43, at 378; Nieman, Choate,
Chrousas, Healy, Morin, Renquist, Merriam, Spitz, Bardin, Balieu & Loriaux, The
Progesterone Antagonist R U486: A Potential New Contraceptive Agent, 316 N. ENG. J. MED.
187 (1987). RU486 is approved for use in France but not in the United States.
45 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 779.
47 Transcript of OralArgument inAbortion Case, N.Y. Times, April 27, 1989, at B12,
col. 5 (former Solicitor General Fried, arguing on behalf of the United States).
Counsel for Appellees gave the following complete reply: "It has always been my
personal experience that when I pull a thread, my sleeve falls off." Id. at B13, col. 1
(argument of Mr. Susman).
48 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (White, J., dissenting)).
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any other merely economic decision that the government may regu-
late by showing only a minimally rational basis.
B. Keeping Reproductive Choice in Private Hands is Essential to a Free
Society
Even if there were any disagreement about the degree of bodily
or decisional autonomy that is essential to personhood, there is a
separate, alternative rationale for the privacy cases: keeping the state
out of the business of reproductive decision-making. Regimentation
of reproduction is a hallmark of the totalitarian state, from Plato's
Republic to Hitler's Germany, from Huxley's Brave New World to
Atwood's Handmaid's Tale. Whether the state compels reproduction
or prevents it, "totalitarian limitation of family size.., is at complete
variance with our constitutional concepts."49 The state's monopoly
of force cautions against any official reproductive orthodoxy.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
the privacy right protects not only the individual but also our society.
As early as Meyer5° and Pierce,5 the Court acknowledged that "[t]he
fundamental theory of liberty" on which a free society rests
"excludes any general power of the State to standardize" its citi-
zens.52 As Justice Powell likewise recognized for the Moore plurality,
"a free society" is one that avoids the homogenization of family
life.53
The right of privacy, like freedoms of speech and religion, pro-
tects conscience and spirit from the encroachment of overbearing
government. "Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment," Justice
Jackson recognized in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,5 4 are the inevitably futile province of "our totalitarian ene-
mies." 55  Preserving a private sphere for childbearing and
childrearing decisions not only liberates the individual; it desirably
constrains the state.56
Those who would relegate all control over abortion to the state
49 Griswold, 381 U.S. 497 at (Goldberg, J., concurring).
50 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
52 Id. at 535.
53 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 n.ll (1977) (quoting
from a discussion of Griswold in Pollak, Thomas L Emerson, Lawyer and Scholar: Ipse
Custodiet Custodes, 84 YALE L.J. 638, 653 (1975)).
54 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
55 Id. at 640-41.
-56 See generally Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 804-07
(1989) (arguing that the constitutional right of privacy protects individuals from
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legislatures ignore these fundamental, systemic values. It is a red
herring to focus on the question ofjudicial versus legislative control
of reproductive decisions, as so many of Roe's critics do. The real
distinction is that between private and public control of the decision:
the private control that the courts protect through Griswold and Roe,
and the public control that the popular branches could well usurp in
a world without those decisions.
Precisely because of the importance of a private sphere for fam-
ily, spirit, and conscience, the Framers never intended to commit all
moral disagreements to the political arena. Quite the contrary:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental fights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
57
Such "withdrawal" of fundamental liberties from the political arena
is basic to constitutional democracy as opposed to rank majoritarian-
ism, and nowhere is such "withdrawal" more important than in con-
troversies where moral convictions and passions run deepest. The
inclusion of the free exercise clause attests to this point.5"
The Framers also never intended that toleration on matters of
family, conscience, and spirit would vary from state to state. The
value of the states and localities as "laborator[ies for] .. .social and
economic experiments,"5 9 has never extended to "'experiments at
the expense of the dignity and personality' of the individual.' ,60
being turned into instrumentalities of the regimenting state, or being forced into a
state-chosen identity).
57 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
58 Justice Douglas wrote:
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and
extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among
them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would
agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the
widest possible toleration of conflicting views.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). See also Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3085 &
n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "the
intensely divisive character of much of the national debate over the abortion issue
reflects the deeply held religious convictions of many participants in the debate").
59 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
60 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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Rather, as Madison once warned, " 'it is proper to take alarm at the
first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to
be the first duty of citizens, and one of [the] noblest characteristics of
the late Revolution.' "61
Roe v. Wade thus properly withdrew the abortion decision, like
other decisions on matters of conscience, "from the vicissitudes of
political controversy." It did not withdraw that decision from the
vicissitudes of moral argument or social suasion by persuasive rather
than coercive means. 62 In withdrawing the abortion decision from
the hot lights of politics, Roe protected not only persons but the
processes of constitutional democracy.
III. STRICT SCRUTINY
The scrutiny to be afforded government restrictions on abortion
has emerged, at least in the Court in recent years, as far more con-
troversial than the existence of the underlying liberty interest itself.
At the threshold, there is the question whether all abortion restric-
tions should be subject to strict scrutiny. Justice O'Connor, most
notably, has argued that only those restrictions that "unduly bur-
den" the abortion right should trigger strict scrutiny. There is also
the question of what governmental interests may be sufficiently
"compelling" to justify restrictions, and even more to the point,
whether interests in maternal health and potential life are compel-
ling throughout pregnancy or, as Roe held, whether they grow as
pregnancy proceeds.
Formally, these are questions of scrutiny. Practically, they are
much more. Depending on their answers, the Justices could wholly
eviscerate Roe's fundamental liberty interest-without ever formally
questioning its existence.
In her most detailed statement on abortion, a 1983 dissent in
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,63 Justice O'Connor
sharply criticized Roe's trimester approach. She argued that it "can-
not be supported as a legitimate or useful framework for accommo-
dating the woman's right and the State's interests. '"64 Three years
later, dissenting in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
61 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65 (1947) (Appendix, Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments).
62 Nor, of course, did it bar political efforts to reduce the abortion rate through
non-coercive means, such as funding sex education and contraception, or providing
economic security to indigent mothers.
63 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 454 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Gynecologists,65 Justice O'Connor concluded that the "Court's
unworkable scheme for constitutionalizing the regulation of abor-
tion" had had a debilitating effect, "not... surprising... since the
Court is not suited to the expansive role it has claimed for itself in
the series of cases that began with Roe v. Wade."66
But notwithstanding the occasional strength of her rhetoric, Jus-
tice O'Connor has never questioned Roe's central premise that the
liberty to choose abortion is fundamental, nor accepted ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's and Justice White's view that any state interest at any
point in pregnancy may, if a state legislature chooses, outweigh a
woman's right to choose. Quite to the contrary, she has sought to
articulate a test which, again depending on how it is applied, could
protect women at least against significant burdens of their privacy
rights. How her approach could work, or fail and become a subter-
fuge for the Rehnquist sleight-of-hand approach, is the subject of
this section.
A. The Threshold Inquiry: Finding an "Undue Burden"
Usually in constitutional law, the question whether a right has
been infringed is easy: it's the question of whether the infringement
is justified that is difficult. The mode of infringement may sometimes
affect the scrutiny applied; for example, content-based speech regu-
lation is more closely scrutinized by the Court than content-neutral
laws that happen to burden speech.67 But rarely does the quantity of
infringement matter; freedom of speech, for example has been held
infringed by regulations that merely marginally increase its cost, 68 or
pose the potential for discriminatory application 6 9-as well as by
laws that prohibitively increase cost or actually discriminate.
Similarly in the abortion context, the Court has found strict
scrutiny triggered not only when states criminalize abortion, but also
65 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66 Id at 814-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67 Compare Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972)
(invalidating a regulation that discriminated on the basis of the subject matter of
speech) with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("[W]hen 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.").
68 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating anti-leafletting
law designed to prevent the public cost of cleaning up litter).
69 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)
(invalidating an ordinance allowing the mayor standardless discretion to license
newsracks on city property).
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when regulations well short of criminalization encumber abortion
with delay, administrative hurdles, or expense. 70 Deterrents need
not rise to the level of coercion to count as infringements of the
right.
Justice O'Connor, however, has suggested that the quantity of
burden an abortion restriction imposes should matter a great deal.
In her Akron dissent, she argued that the Court's abortion cases
required strict scrutiny only where a state imposes an "undue bur-
den" on the abortion decision.
71
What kind of burden must plaintiffs show? On the one hand,
regulations whose actual impact on the abortion decision is minimal,
speculative, or both are excluded from strict scrutiny, and subject
only to review to determine if they are rationally related to a valid
state objective.72 On the other hand, regulations that "drastically
limit[]," or impose an "absolute obstacle" or "coercive restraint"
trigger strict scrutiny. 7' The key question, of course, is what hap-
pens to the myriad of regulations falling between these poles, which
states pass, in many cases quite explicitly, to restrict abortion.
From Justice O'Connor's own opinions, it is clear that the
threshold inquiry should be quantitative rather than qualitative: the
issue is the amount of impact, not the justification for it. Justice
O'Connor's opinions also make clear that the obstacle need not
affect all women; that other women, or average women, or women
who may be older and richer can continue to choose freely, or at all
does not render the burden "due" on those whom it affects most.
The question, though, is not simply one of quantity, objectively
measured. If the inquiry is to be fair, it must be conducted from the
woman's point of view. The relevant assessment of burden must be
hers, not a legislator's or judge's.
70 The Akron, 462 U.S. at 416, and Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747, cases best
illustrate this point.
71 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 453, 461-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72 In other contexts, Justice O'Connor has shown a similar inclination not to
apply strict scrutiny to cases where the impact on fundamental rights is merely trivial
or incidental. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), for example, the
Court upheld the closing of a brothel that happened to be located in a bookstore.
Justice O'Connor concurred, reasoning that strict scrutiny was not triggered: "Any
other conclusion would lead to the absurd result that any government action that had
some conceivable speech-inhibiting consequences, such as the arrest of a newscaster
for a traffic violation, would require analysis under the First Amendment." Id. at 708
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
73 Akron, 462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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1. The Question of Degree
At first glance, the term "undue burden" may seem to express a
judgment rather than a description: the concept not that a burden is
heavy but that it is too heavy. Justice O'Connor's own opinions sug-
gest otherwise. She expressly rejected such a qualitative definition
when given a chance, and adopted a quantitative definition instead.
In Akron, then-Solicitor General Rex E. Lee argued that only
where an abortion regulation "unduly burdens" a woman's right to
choose should the Court apply strict scrutiny to review that regula-
tion. Under Lee's formulation, the Court should "accord heavy def-
erence to the legislative judgment" in determining what constitutes
an "undue burden." Justice O'Connor, while concluding that the
"undue burden" test should define the threshold for strict scrutiny,
took sharp issue with the Solicitor General's qualitative definition of
that test. Justice O'Connor declared "undue burden" is a strictly
quantitive concept:
"The 'unduly burdensome' standard is appropriate not because it
incorporates deference to legislative judgment at the threshold
stage of analysis, but rather because of the limited nature of the fun-
damental right that has been recognized in the abortion cases....
[I]t is not appropriate to weigh the state interests at the threshold
stage."
74
The measure of whether a burden is "undue" therefore, is not
whether it is justified, but whether it is significant.
In determining whether a burden is "undue" in this sense, Jus-
tice O'Connor has treated one issue as squarely resolved by the
Court's precedents: a regulation need not burden all women in order
to trigger strict scrutiny. The right recognized in Roe is a right pos-
sessed by every pregnant woman. A regulation that "drastically lim-
its" even one woman's freedom should trigger strict scrutiny. Justice
O'Connor herself recognized in Akron that regulations affecting some
but not all women can impose "undue burdens." 75 While Roe was, in
her analysis, unduly burdensome because it criminalized all abor-
tions except those necessary to save the mother's life, the prohibition
of saline amniocentesis struck down in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth76 also constituted an undue burden even though
it only affected women seeking second-trimester abortions, and
74 Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 n.10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing amicus curiae
brief for the United States).
75 Id. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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notwithstanding that the overwhelming majority of abortions occur
during the first trimester.7 7 The same was true for the parental and
spousal consent requirements that the Court invalidated in Danforth
and Bellotti v. Baird."78 these regulations warranted strict scrutiny
even though they would impose an "absolute obstacle" only to those
women (surely a minority of some sort) who are both covered by the
regulations (married or minors) and also unable to secure the requi-
site parental or spousal consent.
Problems of proof remain, however, even if the standard is so
defined. How does a woman prove that she is being blocked, or lim-
ited, or burdened? While Justice O'Connor has expressed concern
with regulations whose impact is speculative, at least at the time of
suit,79 it is simply unfair, and unnecessary, to require that a woman
actually sacrifice her constitutional liberty before she or anyone else
can challenge a restriction on her freedom. The Court should not
demand an unwanted child, or a woman maimed by an illegal abor-
tion, as proof that strict scrutiny is warranted.
2. The Question of Perspective
Because Justice O'Connor's test is based on the obstacle to the
woman making the abortion decision, the only appropriate perspec-
tive for assessing the burden is that woman's. Justice O'Connor her-
self recognized a similar point in the context of a possible state
establishment of religion; the question is not whether a Christian
might view a creche scene as religious, but whether a non-Christian
would.80 So too, the question here is not whether ajudge or a legis-
lator or the law's perennial "reasonable man" would judge an
increase in cost or a requirement of notification to be a "drastic
limit." The question is whether a pregnant woman, or girl, would.8"
It is not simply a matter of a man's perspective versus a woman's
or, all too often, a girl's. Unwanted pregnancies strike harder at the
poor and the young than at comfortable adults. Inadequate health
77 See id. at 79.
78 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
79 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 466 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding no "undue
burden" in Akron's second-trimester hospitalization requirement where "there is no
evidence in this case to show that the two Akron hospitals that performed second-
trimester abortions denied an abortion to any woman, or that they would not permit
abortion by the D&E procedure .... In addition, there was no evidence presented
that other hospitals in nearby areas did not provide second-trimester abortions.").
80 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984).
81 Cf S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (discussing the relevance of men's versus
women's perspective on force and consent in rape).
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care, incomplete birth control information, and violence and abuse,
are far more common realities for poor and young women than for
middle class adults. Moreover, while a $50 difference in cost may
appear modest to most members of the Supreme Court, whose fami-
lies are insured in any event, it is a lifetime's savings for a teenage
girl. To forget her perspective could, quite literally, cost her life.
Nor is it fair to forget that the person facing the obstacle is likely
desperate. Justice O'Connor recognized in Akron that the abortion
decision is a "stressful one." It is particularly stressful for women
who must face it alone, without the support of family, without the
advice of a private physician, without the comfort of age and experi-
ence. It is precisely these women for whom the burdens of securing
an abortion are already greatest, who are most often the targets and
victims of restrictive abortion legislation. The undue burden test
becomes a mockery if it permits legislatures to pass restrictions with
little or no application to people like them, and then insist that their
perspective should govern the scrutiny to be applied.
Adopting a woman's perspective, however, is not an excuse to
use a woman's desperation against her. The fact that many women
seeking abortions would go to great lengths, and sometimes do to
avoid having a child they cannot take care of should not be grounds
for allowing a state to regulate more. That is the problem with defin-
ing the "undue burden" test in terms of "absolute obstacles:" for a
desperate woman, burdens which surely should be considered
"undue" may not be absolute because of her desperation. To insist,
even if only in theory,82 that a woman prove she has been blocked, or
would be, goes beyond a measure of the burden. The only fair ques-
tion is whether the obstacle or burden is, considered from her per-
spective, significant or substantial. To demand more is to turn logic
on its head, effectively holding that the most desperate among us
can, because of that, be burdened the most.
Which raises a final point of perspective: restrictions that, con-
sidered one by one by a court, may not appear undue are not exper-
ienced that way by a woman seeking an abortion. She experiences
them all, and usually at once. A state should not be able to escape
strict scrutiny by parsing an undue burden into a multi-part legisla-
tive package.
So long as every non-trivial burden is subject to strict scrutiny,
the difference between a legislator's perspective and a woman's, or
82 See supra text accompanying note 79 (the Court should not require past injury
to prove that the harm is not speculative).
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between one burden and a legislative package, does not matter so
much: all burdens must be justified by a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored to serve that goal. But if a threshold is to be estab-
lished before strict scrutiny is applied, then questions of perspective
and aggregation become not only critical, but in many cases determi-
native. Fairly applied, the "undue burden" test can still provide a
reasonable measure at least of potential protection to women;
unfairly applied, it is an even easier route than the Webster plurality's
to eviscerate women's rights.
3. Questions of Application
Justice O'Connor's application of the "undue burden" concept in
practice has been far more troublesome than its invocation in the
abstract. First, she has never acknowledged that significant cost
increases constitute "burdens" on abortion. Yet, as every anti-abor-
tion legislator well knows, one of the best ways to deter abortion is to
raise the price. Hospitalization requirements, for example, make
abortions significantly more expensive than they are in clinics.8 3 In
Akron, Justice O'Connor pointed to only one case, Doe v. Bolton, 84 in
which the Court invalidated regulations she would have upheld. The
regulations invalidated in Doe included, among others, a first trimes-
ter hospitalization requirement.
To be sure, Justice O'Connor's dispute with Doe may not have
turned on her minimizing the costs of that requirement. The Court's
decision, as Justice O'Connor correctly pointed out, was not based
on an analysis of the regulation's impact on the abortion right, par-
ticularly among the poor for whom a many-fold increase in price is
the functional equivalent of absolute prohibition. Rather, "[t]he
Court clearly based its disapproval of these requirements on the fact
that the State did not impose them on any other medical procedure
apart from abortion. '"85 This rationale for applying strict scrutiny is
the one with which Justice O'Connor plainly takes issue.
In Akron itself, Justice O'Connor more explicitly confronted the
issue of cost. In that case, the Court struck down a series of regula-
tions as violative of Roe, and Justice O'Connor dissented. The key
provision of the Ohio statute, at least for purposes of understanding
Justice O'Connor's approach, was the requirement that doctors per-
83 See Turnock v. Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57
U.S.L.W. 3859 (1989). Ragsdale settled before oral argument.
84 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
85 Akron, 462 U.S. at 464 n.9 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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form all second trimester abortions in hospitals. In striking down
this requirement, the majority reasoned the rule imposed a "signifi-
cant obstacle" for women because it would have substantially
increased the cost of abortions because second-trimester abortions
were rarely performed in Akron hospitals, and because it might force
women to travel substantial distances. Justice O'Connor found the
majority's reliance on increased costs and decreased availability
"misplaced." 6
It is possible to read Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the
majority as a difference of view as to the factual showing required to
establish a "substantial obstacle" or "undue burden." In her view:
[T]here [was] no evidence.., to show that the two Akron hospitals
that performed second-trimester abortions denied an abortion to
any woman, or that they would not permit abortion by the D & E
procedure.... In addition, there was no evidence presented that
other hospitals in nearby areas did not provide second-trimester
abortions.
8 7
Regardless of availability questions, however, Justice
O'Connor's answer to the Akron majority plainly ignored the cost
question. In Webster, she at least recognized that cost differentials
could be a significant factor, but her own position remains inconclu-
sive. In rejecting the plurality's effort to manufacture a conflict with
Roe, she focused on cost to distinguish the second trimester hospital-
ization requirement struck down in Akron from the fetal viability test-
ing requirements upheld in Webster." The problem is that Justice
O'Connor does not say how much of an increase would trigger strict
scrutiny, even though from the perspective of a woman seeking an
abortion, the cost of hospitalization plainly is a substantial obstacle.
A second, perhaps even more troubling aspect of Justice
86 See id. at 466.
87 Id. The Court has not required such a demonstration of foreclosed
alternatives in other contexts. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 76 (1981) (rejecting government's argument that those aggrieved by a nude
dancing ban could always go elsewhere).
88 Justice O'Connor wrote:
The second-trimester hospitalization requirement struck down in Akron
imposed, in the majority's view, "a heavy, and unnecessary, burden,"
more than doubling the cost of "women's access to a relatively
inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." By
contrast, the cost of examinations and tests that could usefully and
prudently be performed when a woman is 20-24 weeks pregnant to
determine whether the fetus is viable would only marginally, if at all,
increase the cost of an abortion.
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3063 (citations omitted).
19891
140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:119
O'Connor's application of her "undue burden" test in Akron is her
suggestion that health regulations may never constitute "undue bur-
dens" and should escape strict scrutiny. According to Justice
O'Connor, a health regulation, which may be based on physical,
emotional, or psychological factors, "simply does not rise to the level
of 'official interference' with the abortion decision."89
Perhaps dicta in a dissent ought not be taken too seriously. Still,
this statement flatly contradicts Justice O'Connor's own definition of
the "undue burden" test. It goes well beyond any kind of quantita-
tive measure of the burden imposed, substituting instead precisely
the sort of qualitative deference to a legislature for which Justice
O'Connor chastised Solicitor General Lee. It would, if taken liter-
ally, potentially rubber stamp any regulation that might be justified
as "health-related" regardless of the magnitude of its impact on a
woman's freedom to choose.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's exemption of all health regula-
tions from strict scrutiny would permit those that are merely pretex-
tual a free ride. If the actual purpose of a supposed "health"
regulation is to discourage abortion pure and simple, then it should
not stand, though a mere rational-basis review will let it do so on the
ground of a conceivable relationship to health.90 Those are appro-
priate questions for the justification stage: to preclude them at the
threshold turns Justice O'Connor's approach entirely on its head.
B. The Justification Stage
Roe v. Wade held the "right of privacy . . . broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy,"'" but the right is not absolute. The right to choose abortion,
like free speech or free exercise of religion, places an additional bur-
den on government to justify regulation. As the Court announced in
Roe, the test is an exacting one: regulation of the abortion decision
89 Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90 Justice O'Connor herself has suggested that where burdens on speech are
imposed on the pretext of some general regulatory interest, strict rather than
deferential scrutiny is appropriate: "[i]f... a city were to use a nuisance statute as a
pretext for closing down a bookstore because it sold indecent books . . . the case
would clearly implicate First Amendment concerns and require analysis under the
appropriate First Amendment standard of review." Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478
U.S 697, 708 (1986). No less should be true for pretextual burdens on abortion.
91 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
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"may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' " to which it is
"narrowly drawn." 92
That is a standard definition of "strict scrutiny." Roe's use of
trimesters to guide the application of strict scrutiny has been more
controversial than the standard itself. At the same time, though, crit-
ics of the trimester approach, Justice O'Connor included, have had
far more success in attacking it than in proposing alternatives. While
health regulations may fairly be subject to strict scrutiny regardless
of the trimester in which the state imposes them, regulations that
seek to preserve potential life pose a direct conflict with the very
interest that triggers scrutiny. Justice O'Connor has yet to suggest a
substitute for trimesters in this context.
1. The Attack on Roe's Trimesters
In Roe, the Court identified two state interests that might be
deemed sufficiently "compelling" to limit a woman's fundamental
right to choose abortion. The state, the Court found, "does have an
important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman," and "it has still another important
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life."93
What is known, and criticized, as Roe's trimester analysis is the
categorical balance that the Court struck between these two state
interests and a woman's right to choose abortion. Emphasizing that
abortion mortality rates are less than childbirth mortality rates until
the end of the first trimester, the Court marked this point as the time
when the State's interest in maternal health becomes sufficiently
compelling to allow regulating abortion procedures on that basis.
Until the point of "viability," defined as the point where the fetus
could live outside the mother's womb, 94 the Court held that the
state's interest in preserving potential life was secondary to the
mother's right to control her own body.
This balance has been subject to two sets of criticisms. Justice
O'Connor has voiced both. First, she criticizes the trimester lines as
legal constructs based on changing medical technology, putting Roe
on a collision course with itself.95 Second, she criticizes the Roe tri-
92 Id. at 155.
93 Id. at 162.
94 The Roe Court fixed viability at between 24 and 28 weeks. See id. at 160.
95 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See generally Rhoden,
Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 640 n.8 (1986)
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mester framework as setting arbitrary points to recognize state inter-
ests as compelling.
The first critique is based on a view that a medical technology
advances, abortions will be safer, thus moving the "maternal health"
demarcation line later, but "viability" will come sooner, thus moving
the "preservation of potential life line" earlier. As Justice O'Connor
argued in Akron:
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself.
As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the
point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal
health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical
science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence
of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward con-
ception .... The Roe framework is inherently tied to the state of
medical technology that exists whenever particular litigation
ensues.
96
The "viability" line has, in fact, proven far more stable than
either Roe's supporters or critics hoped or feared. "Neonates less
than 24 weeks gestational age [the earliest point cited in Roe] have
close to 0% survival rate ... [B]efore [this point], the fetal organs,
especially the lungs, are not sufficiently developed to permit extra-
uterine survival even with the most sophisticated technology cur-
rently available."9 7 The maternal safety line, though, most surely
has moved. The Akron majority recognized this fact, citing findings
that show abortion may be safer than childbirth up to gestational
ages of 16 weeks. 98 This movement, if not causing a collision, has
forced the Court to confront whether the trimester lines are legally
or medically based.
Or neither. The Akron majority, while acknowledging that the
medical justification for Roe's demarcation line between the first and
second trimester had disappeared, found it "prudent" to retain Roe's
identification of the beginning of the second trimester as the approx-
imate time when the State's interest in maternal health becomes suf-
ficiently compelling to justify significant abortion restrictions. Not
sufficiently "compelling," however, to justify Akron's second trimes-
(noting that while it has become customary to speak of Roe in terms of trimesters, the
Roe Court itself framed its holding in terms of the first trimester and then of stages
marked by viability; placing viability roughly at the end of the second trimester).
96 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97 NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, FETAL EXTRAUTERINE
SURVIVABILITY 10, 12 (1988).
98 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.1 I.
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ter hospitalization requirement. Even in the second trimester, the
Akron Court required a "reasonable medical basis" for regulations,
and found it lacking where, as here, required hospitalization early in
the second trimester "departs from accepted medical practice."9 9
That resolution only added fuel to Justice O'Connor's fire.
Plainly, the usual advantage of clear lines is their predictability, but
that advantage is lost when, even past the formal demarcation point,
constitutionality turns on the medical practice of the day.
Although legislatures are better suited to make the necessary fac-
tual judgments in this area, the Court's framework forces legisla-
tures, as a matter of constitutional law, to speculate about what
constitutes 'accepted medical practice' at any given time. Without
the necessary expertise or ability, courts must then pretend to act
as science review boards and examine those legislative
judgments.
10 0
That was only the half of it. Justice O'Connor's concerns with
the trimester analysis did not depend solely on its relationship to
changing medical technology. For her, the "fallacy inherent in the
Roe framework" was even more basic:
J]ust because the State has a compelling interest in ensuring
maternal safety once an abortion may be more dangerous than
childbirth, it simply does not follow that the State has no interest
before that point that justifies state regulation to ensure that first-
trimester abortions are performed as safely as possible.101
In the same vein, Justice O'Connor rejected limiting the state's inter-
est in potential human life to the period after viability:
The state interest in potential human life is likewise extant
throughout the pregnancy. In Roe, the Court held that although
the State had an important and legitimate interest in protecting
potential life, that interest could not become compelling until the
point at which the fetus was viable. The difficulty with this analysis
is clear: potential life is no less potential in the first weeks of preg-
nancy than it is at viability or afterward. At any stage in pregnancy,
there is the potential for human life.... The choice of viability as the
point at which the state interest in potential life becomes compelling
is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any
point afterward.
10 2
99 Id.; id. at 434.
100 Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
102 Id. at 460-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The next sections reply to these criticisms.
2. The State Interest in Maternal Health
Justice O'Connor is surely right that the state has some interest in
protecting newly-pregnant women, as it does in protecting all citi-
zens. Few would doubt, fot instance, that state interest is sufficiently
great to subject abortion clinics to reasonable licensing procedures,
even in the first trimester. In fact, the Danforth Court unanimously
upheld two statutory provisions requiring that even during the first
trimester, women provide informed, written consent to abortions
and physicians keep certain records. The Court upheld the regula-
tions even though the state did not impose comparable requirements
on most other medical procedures.1
0 3
Even if the Court abandoned the trimester approach, however, it
should nonetheless strike down many abortion regulations passed in
the name of health. Strict scrutiny requires not only a compelling
interest in the abstract, but also that a regulation is in fact tailored to
further it. As Justice O'Connor herself stated for the Court in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 104 "the mere recitation of a 'benign' or
legitimate purpose" is simply not enough when infringement of fun-
damental rights is at stake. Under strict scrutiny, "simple legislative
assurances of good intention cannot suffice." 0 5 In Croson, the Court
refused to allow a city council's general assertion of remedial pur-
pose to justify disadvantaging non-minority applicants seeking to do
business with the city. The Court looked into actual purpose and
demanded that the government seek to further that purpose through
narrowly tailored regulations. Surely, if the Court requires such an
exacting inquiry before a city can deny business opportunities to
whites, it can require nothing less before states burden women in the
exercise of their fundamental rights.
10 6
Indeed, in practice, fairly applying strict scrutiny to health regu-
lations throughout pregnancy should produce roughly the same
results as the much-maligned "trimester" approach. To be sure,
under the Akron majority's view, "health" concerns could not justify
103 See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67,
79-81 (1976).
104 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
105 Id. at 724.
106 Indeed, given their relative strengths in the political process, the inquiry, if
anything, should be far more exacting when women seeking abortions are
disadvantaged than when whites (particularly white males) seeking business are. See
infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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significant obstacles in the first trimester, but then, it is hard to see
how such obstacles could ever survive appropriately strict scrutiny.
Regardless of one's point of view on trimesters per se, there is no
reason why a state should be entitled to impose substantial health
obstacles at a time when the safety risks are so minimal. Substantial
obstacles "based" on health at that point are at least unnecessary
and most likely pretextual. ' °7 As such, these restrictions should fail
strict scrutiny whether or not the Court invokes trimesters.
During every trimester, according to the majority approach,
health regulations must indeed further health, and as Justice
O'Connor's Webster approach suggests, they must not require doc-
tors and health professionals to depart from standard practice. In
principle, strict scrutiny could require nothing less.
Of course, as her Akron dissent clearly shows, Justice O'Connor
remains concerned with the competence of a legislature, and then a
court, to review medical technology and adapt it in a timely fashion
to law. No one,. however, is requiring any legislature to regulate for
health purposes in ways that burden the abortion decision, particu-
larly when abortion is and continues to be, safer than many other
unregulated medical procedures. If legislatures nonetheless choose
to regulate "for health reasons," it is fair to demand that their regu-
lations actually further maternal health. Absent that fit, they are
unnecessarily burdening fundamental rights, and where abortion
restrictions depart from medical practice, that should trigger, loud
and clear, the question of whether the stated justification was truly
the motivating factor.
3. The State Interest in Potential Life
If taken only on its own terms, Justice O'Connor's conclusion
that the state interest in protecting potential life exists throughout
pregnancy is, like her view of the state interest in maternal health,
not very controversial. What is controversial is whether courts must
consider all regulations that further it automatically compelling.
Importantly, Justice O'Connor has never joined the ChiefJustice and
Justice White in the latter proposition, and rightly so.108
States, and the federal government, have long regulated toxic
substances in the work place which may cause harm to fetuses and
107 As Justice O'Connor herself noted in Croson, a chief purpose of the narrow-
tailoring inquiry is to " 'smoke out' " regulations whose stated goal is pretextual. See
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
108 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (plurality opinion).
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probably should do more, provided that the means does not discrim-
inate against women workers.' 0 9 States regularly impose criminal
and civil penalties when a fetus, pre- or post-viability, dies because of
intentional or negligent injury to a pregnant woman.
But it is not the case, scientifically at least, that "potential life is
no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability
or afterward.""'  In the early weeks of pregnancy, the chances of
"spontaneous abortion" (miscarriage) are as high as 20% to 30% or
more, and they may be highest for unplanned and unwanted
pregnancies, where intake of the drugs and medications that may
contribute to miscarriage is likeliest. By the thirteenth week, as many
as 90% of these miscarriages have occurred. Accordingly, even if
some interest in potential life existed all along the continuum from
fertilization to birth, surely its magnitude, and thus the balance of
interests between woman and fetus, must alter along the way."'
Even more fundamentally, there is only one way to protect
potential life before a fetus has the potential to survive outside the
womb: forbid or discourage abortion." 2 After viability, there are
surely other ways abortion regulations can preserve an interest in
potential life. For example, the state may require two doctors' pres-
ence or forbid saline procedures in late abortions to enhance survival
rates if an attempted abortion turns into a live birth. Imposing any
"undue burdens," or indeed any burdens at all, on a woman's right
prior to viability in the name of preserving life, though, is to say that a
woman has a right and then to take it away. By definition, her right is
to control her bodily autonomy even at the expense offpotential human life.
Every abortion regulation, including the absolute prohibition
struck down in Roe, can be defended by its supporters as furthering
the state's interest in preserving potential human life. To acknowl-
edge that the state interest does not itself magically "appear" at the
point of viability may comport with common sense, but that is not,
after all, a fair statement of Roe's holding. The question Roe asked
109 See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc); id. at 1650-55 (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 1655-65 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
110 Akron, 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
I"I See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112 At least that approach is the only way an abortion regulation can serve an
interest in potential life. Prior to viability, regulation of a pregnant woman's
nutrition, exercise, ingestion of dangerous substances, and health habits might serve
an interest in protecting the quality of "potential life," but it raises many other
problems. See Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 114, 144 (1989).
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and answered, here as in the case of a state's interest in maternal
health, was not whether the state might have any valid interest cogni-
zable in any setting, but rather when, if at all, the Court could con-
sider the state interest sufficiently "compelling" to override a
woman's right to have an abortion. It was that question to which via-
bility provided the answer.
Scrupulous application of traditional strict scrutiny should, in
certain cases, produce the same result as the Court's viability line.
After viability, requiring a second physician may in fact further the
state interest: he may help save the life of the neonate. Before viabil-
ity, by definition, he could not. The only way the regulation pre-
serves potential human life is by making abortions more expensive
and therefore discouraging if not blocking them. That will be true of
every regulation that seeks to preserve human life prior to viability.
In that sense, the disagreement between Justice O'Connor and the
Roe majority may, ultimately, be a disagreement about whether rec-
ognizing a fundamental right limits the state's ability to block its
exercise.
Plainly, even if it decided that a calendar setting is not an appro-
priate demarcation point, the Court would still have to find some
standard other than asking whether any given regulation "reasonably
relates" to preserving potential life. Without an alternative, the
answer would always be yes, even for criminal prohibition in cases of
rape and incest, or where the mother's life is at stake. Such scrutiny
is not only not strict; it negates the fundamental right that triggers it.
Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice White, Justice O'Connor
cannot intend this result. In fact, her own emphasis on the threshold
inquiry into the burden's "undueness" indicates that she does not.
Justice O'Connor's inquiry would be irrelevant if every abortion reg-
ulation could be found to serve a compelling interest in potential
life. Therefore, she must think that many "undue burdens" are
unjustified even though states impose them in the name of preserv-
ing potential life. But the question remains, whatever Justice
O'Connor's approach requires in theory, how it works in practice.
4. Questions of Application
In Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, decided the same day as
Akron,"' Justice O'Connor once again dissented from the Court's
decision that a second trimester hospitalization provision was uncon-
113 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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stitutional. She stated: "Assuming, arguendo, that the requirement
was an undue burden, it would nevertheless 'reasonably relat[e] to
the preservation and protection of maternal health.' "114 She
reached the same conclusion, following the same analysis, with
respect to Missouri's requirement, upheld by the majority, that a sec-
ond physician be present to attend to the fetus in a post-viability
abortion: "I agree that the second physician requirement ... is con-
stitutional because the State possesses a compelling interest in pro-
tecting and preserving fetal life, but I believe that this state interest is
extant throughout pregnancy. I therefore concur .... t
This statement, along with a similar one in Akron approving a
twenty-four hour waiting period which the Court struck down,'" 6
raises some difficult questions about Justice O'Connor's approach.
In Akron, she described the test as an exacting one, but her cursory
application of it, in the arguendo form to be sure, does not require
careful tailoring to a compelling interest. Rather, it mandates no
more than a "reasonable relationship." As argued above, one could
justify virtually any regulation, including one that blocked abortions
completely or in practice, as "reasonably related" to preserving
potential human life. Justice O'Connor's citation of Roe for the "rea-
sonable relationship" language is somewhat disingenuous, because
Roe recognizes this interest as compelling only in the third trimester.
Justice O'Connor, by contrast, emphasized in Ashcroft as in Akron that
she considers the state interest in preserving potential life, like its
interest in maternal health, to be "extant" throughout pregnancy.
But equally compelling? Regardless of the countervailing interest?
Regardless of proof of impact or intent?
It is one thing to require a second physician to protect potential
life after viability. Imposing this same requirement in the first trimes-
ter, however, would only increase abortion's cost without creating
any countervailing benefits to the fetus. Abandoning the trimester
approach without taking these differences into account effectively
overrules Roe, and replaces it with a rule of nine months of deference
to any regulation that anyone can relate to safety or potential life.
That rule is precisely what Texas argued for in Roe, what Solicitor
General Lee sought in Akron, and what Chief Justice Rehnquist
attempted in Webster. It is not what Justice O'Connor's approach
seems to require. But neither her Akron or Ashcroft opinion elucidates
1 14 Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113).
115 Id.
116 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 473-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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her answers to the inevitable need for some other means to strike the
balance.
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion three years later in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists" 7 does little to
resolve these issues. Thornburgh went no further in the district court
than the denial of preliminary relief. The bulk ofJustice O'Connor's
dissent explains her disagreement with the majority's decision to
review facially and strike down a number of Pennsylvania provisions.
Injustice O'Connor's view, the Court of Appeals, if it disagreed with
the district court's assessment of the "likelihood of success on the
merits," should have remanded with an order to grant preliminary
relief. Instead, the Court of Appeals reviewed and permanently
enjoined a number of the statute's provisions. The Supreme Court
affirmed. "In so doing," Justice O'Connor stated, "the Court pre-
maturely decides serious constitutional questions on an inadequate
record, in contravention of settled principles of constitutional adju-
dication and procedural fairness."' 
1 8
The procedural dispute between the majority and Justice
O'Connor is itself an almost natural outgrowth of the differences
between her approach and Roe. UnderJustice O'Connor's approach,
the regulations' actual impact is the crucial determinant of whether a
state has imposed an "undue burden" requiring strict scrutiny. By
contrast, for the majority, Roe's trimesters in effect impose limits on
certain kinds of regulation even if the impact is lower or more specu-
lative than an O'Connor "undue burden." This difference, at least in
part, explains why the factual record and potentially narrowed inter-
pretations that a remand might provide would be more determina-
tive for her than for the majority.
There is plainly another factor at work as well. In both Thorn-
burgh and Akron, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority as to
the permissible requirements for informed consent. In Akron, the
question was whether the state could require a doctor to give these
warnings himself, or impose a 24-hour waiting period between con-
senting to an abortion and having one. In Thornburgh, her disagree-
ment centered on the requirement that someone be available to
provide a woman seeking an abortion with information about the
risks of the procedure, fetal characteristics, the availability of medical
assistance benefits, and the father's legal responsibility. In striking
down these provisions, the majority ruled that the state's purpose
117 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
118 Id. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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was to limit abortions, and the effect was to increase women's anxiety
and to intrude on the doctor-patient relationship.
Justice O'Connor is plainly unmoved by such factors. To be
sure, she was careful to point out that requiring health professionals
to provide such information, let alone to read it aloud to illiterate
women, raised first amendment concerns. She also noted that if the
material was inaccurate and inflammatory, the requirement might
have been an "undue burden" even if the woman requested to see
the information. Still,Justice O'Connor plainly does not believe that
women have any constitutional right to be shielded from the painful
realities of their choice. Even though an overnight waiting period,
accurate information, detailed warnings and the like make it more
difficult for women who choose to abort, this is not the sort of diffi-
culty Justice O'Connor sees as an excessive burden.
Justice O'Connor's motives in this regard hardly appear puni-
tive. She, like all of us, plainly sees the abortion decision as some-
thing more and something different than other trips to the doctor.
We cannot imagine that any woman, particularly any woman who has
made that decision, would disagree. Even assuming, though, that
states may affirmatively encourage childbirth through selective sub-
sidy, as Justice O'Connor makes clear that they are entitled to do, "19
it is another matter to seek this goal by imposing obstacles on
women who wish to exercise their constitutional right to disagree
with this particular state policy. Harris v. McRae, 120 upon which Jus-
tice O'Connor relies to argue that states may encourage childbirth
without "fine-tuning" their statute "to encourage or facilitate abor-
tion," involved an affirmative government decision to provide funds
to poor women for childbirth, but not for abortion. Whatever posi-
tion one takes on the decision to fund, it is surely different than a
state policy which seeks to "encourage childbirth" by taxing abortion.
Even assuming that rewards may be appropriate to secure the end of
childbirth, punishments should not.
IV. THE POLITICAL PROCESS: NOT To BE TRUSTED
On October 13, 1989, The New York Times declared that the tide
119 "[Sltate action 'encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent
circumstances' is 'rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
protecting potential life.' "Akron,462 U.S. at 466 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)). For criticism of the Court's refusal to
find selective subsidies an infringement of the abortion right, see Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416, 1474, 1500-03 (1989).
120 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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had turned in the political process on abortion.' 2 ' The Florida legis-
lature, in special session, rejected a series of proposals to restrict
abortion, and Congress voted to expand abortion funding for poor
women to cases of rape and incest. And most stunningly of all, the
Attorney General of Illinois on November 2, 1989, settled a pending
challenge to Illinois' abortion clinic regulation rather than risk win-
ning his case in the United States Supreme Court. These events
have triggered the assessment that the post-Webster pro-choice mobil-
ization has succeeded. Which raises the question: why not leave
these matters to the political process?
The short answer, of course, is that we don't leave freedom of
speech or religion or association to the political process, even on
good days when the polls suggest they might stand a chance, at least
in some states. The very essence of a fundamental right is that it
"depend[s] on the outcome of no elections."'
122
The long answer is, as always, that fundamental liberties are not
occasions for the experimentation that federalism invites. The right
to abortion should not depend on where you live and how much
money you have for travel.'12 And, regardless of our recent, at long-
last successes, the reality remains that the political process is to be
trusted the least where, as here, it imposes burdens unequally.
The direct impact of abortion restrictions falls exclusively on a
class of people that consists entirely of women. Only women get
pregnant. Only women have abortions. Only women will endure
unwanted pregnancies and adverse health consequences if states
restrict abortions. Only women will suffer dangerous, illegal abor-
tions where legal ones are unavailable. And only women will bear
children if they cannot obtain abortions.' 24 Yet every restrictive
abortion law has been passed by a legislature in which men consti-
tute a numerical majority. And every restrictive abortion law, by def-
inition, contains an unwritten clause exempting all men from its
strictures.
121 See Apple, An Altered Political Climate Suddenly Surrounds Abortion, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 4; see also Berke, The Abortion-Rights Movement Has Its Day,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1989, § 4 at 1, col. 1.
122 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
123 Even if only ten or eleven states were to preclude abortion within their
borders, many women would be held hostage there by the combination of
geography, poverty, and youth. This situation would be no more tolerable than the
enforcement of racial segregation in a "mere" ten or eleven states in the 1950s.
124 See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981)
("[V]irtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences
of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female").
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As Justice Jackson wrote, legislators threaten liberty when they
pass laws that exempt themselves or people like them: "The Fram-
ers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that
there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed gen-
erally."' 25 The Supreme Court has long interpreted the equal pro-
tection clause to require even-handedness in legislation, lest the
powerful few too casually trade away for others key liberties that they
are careful to reserve for themselves.
For example, in striking down a law permitting castration of
recidivist chicken thieves but sparing white collar embezzlers the
knife, the Court implied that, put to an all-or-nothing choice, legisla-
tors would rather sterilize no one than jeopardize a politically potent
class.' 26 In the words of Justice Jackson: "There are limits to the
extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct bio-
logical experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and
natural powers of a minority-even those who are guilty of what the
majority defines as crimes."'
27
At least there should be. Relying on state legislatures, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist would, to protect women against "abortion regula-
tion reminiscent of the dark ages," '  ignores the fact that the over-
whelming majority of "those who serve in such bodies"' 29 are
biologically exempt from the penalties they are imposing.
The danger is greater still when the subject is abortion. The les-
sons of history are disquieting. Abortion restrictions, like the most
classic restrictions on women seeking to participate in the worlds of
work and ideas, have historically rested pn archaic stereotypes por-
traying women as persons whose "paramount destiny and mission
... [is] to fulfill the noble and benign office of wife and mother."'
' 30
Legislation prohibiting abortion, largely a product of the years
125 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
126 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Cf. Epstein, The Supreme
Court, 1987 Term: Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (arguing that enforcement of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine similarly functions to put legislatures to an all-or-nothing
choice).
127 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring).
128 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3045.
129 Id.
130 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
WRITING FOR AN AUDIENCE OF ONE
between 1860 and 1880, reflected precisely the same ideas about
women's natural and proper roles as other legislation from the same
period, long since discredited, that prohibited women from serving
on juries or participating in the professions, including the practice of
law."' And modem studies have found that support for laws ban-
ning abortion continues to be an outgrowth of the same stereotypical
notions that women's only appropriate roles are those of mother and
housewife. In many cases, abortion laws are a direct reaction to the
increasing number of women who work outside of the home."3 2
Those involved in anti-abortion activities tend to echo the well-
known views of Justice Bradley in Bradwell:
Men and women, as a result of... intrinsic differences, have differ-
ent roles to play. Men are best suited to the public world of work,
whereas women are best suited to rearing children, managing
homes, and loving and caring for husbands .... Mothering, in
their view, is itself a full-time job, and any woman who cannot com-
mit herself fully to mothering should eschew it entirely.
1 3 3
131 See J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 168-72 (1978). To many of the doctors who were
largely responsible for abortion restrictions, "the chief purpose of women was to
produce children; anything that interfered with that purpose, or allowed women to
'indulge' themselves in less important activities, threatened ... the future of society
itself." Id. at 169. The view of one such nineteenth century doctor drew the parallel
even more explicitly: he complained that "the tendency to force women into men's
places" was creating the insidious new idea that a woman's "ministrations . . . as a
mother should be abandoned for the sterner rights of voting and law making." Id. at
105; see also L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976) (chronicling the social and political history of
reproductive rights in the United States).
132 See generally K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 192-215
(1984) (describing how the abortion debate, among women, represents a "war"
between the feminist vision of women in society and the homemaker's world view);
Luker, Abortion and the Meaning of Life, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 25,
31-33 (S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 1984) (concluding that "[b]ecause many
prolife people see sex as literally sacred, and because, for women, procreative sex is a
fundamentalpart of their "career... abortion is, from their [the prolife] point of view, to
turn the world upside down").
133 Luker, supra note 132 at 31. It is, of course, precisely such stereotypes, as
they are reflected in legislation, which have over and over again been the focus of this
Court's modern equal protection cases. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
206-07 (1977) ("Gender-based differentiation.., is forbidden by the Constitution, at
least when supported by no more substantial justification than 'archaic and
overbroad' generalizations."); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)
("Gender-based generalizations" that men are more likely than women to support
their families "cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the effects of women who
do work. ... "); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975) ("A child, male or female,
is still a child. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing
of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.");
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But the lessons of history are not limited to the powers of endur-
ing stereotypes. History also makes clear that a world without Roe
will not be a world without abortion but a world in which abortion is
accessible according to one's constitutional caste. While affluent
women will travel to jurisdictions where safe and legal abortions are
available, paying whatever is necessary, restrictive abortion laws and
with them, the life-threatening prospect of back-alley abortion, will
disproportionately descend upon "those without . . . adequate
resources" to avoid them.' 3 4 Those for whom the burdens of an
unwanted pregnancy may be the most crushing-the young, the
poor, women whose color already renders them victims of discrimi-
nation-will be the ones least able to secure a safe abortion.
In the years before Roe, "[p]oor and minority women were virtu-
ally precluded from obtaining safe, legal procedures, the overwhelm-
ing majority of which were obtained by white women in the private
hospital services on psychiatric indications." ' 5 Women without
access to safe and legal abortions often had dangerous and illegal
ones. According to one study, mishandled criminal abortions were
the leading cause of maternal deaths in the 1960s, t3 6 and mortality
rates for African-American women were as much as nine times the
rate for white women.' 3 7 To trust the political process to protect
these women is to ignore the lessons of history and the realities of
power and powerlessness in America today.
In the face of such lessons, those who would have us put our
faith in the political process might first want to look a little more
closely at the victories which are said to support such a choice. The
Florida legislature's rejection of proposed abortion restrictions came
days after that state's highest court held that the State Constitution
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ("[O]ur Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination... which in practical effect put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage.").
134 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
135 Polgar & Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine Abortions Among the Poor in New
York City Before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 125 (1976); see also
Gold, Therapeutic Abortions in New York: A 20- Year Review, 55 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 964,
66 (1965) (noting that the ratio of legal hospital abortions per live birth was five
times more for white women than for women of color, and twenty-six times more for
white women than for Puerto Rican women in New York City from 1951-62); Pilpel,
The Abortion Crisis, in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 97, 101 (Guttmacher
ed. 1967) (noting that 93% of in-hospital abortions in New York State were
performed on white women who were able to afford private rooms).
136 See Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, in ABORTION AND
THE LAW 37, 37 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
137 See Gold, supra note 135, at 964-65.
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protects the right to choose abortion, rendering the entire session,
by the press' verdict before it began, symbolic at best. The session
was still a triumph, but hardly one in which the courts were beside
the point. And while extending funding to cases of rape and incest
would have been a step forward, the narrowness of the victory and
the veto of the resulting legislation should give pause, at least.'
3 8
We believe that energizing and mobilizing pro-choice voters,
and women in particular, is vitally important on its own terms. We
hope, frankly, that with apportionment approaching in 1990, that
mobilization will affect issues well beyond abortion. We hope more
women will find themselves running for office and winning. We
hope pro-choice voters and the legislators they elect will attack a
range of issues of particular importance to women, including the
attention that children receive after they are born.
But we have no illusions. We will lose some along the way.
Young and poor and minority women will pay most dearly when we
do. That's the way it is in politics. That's why politics should not
dictate constitutional rights. That's why women need Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor so badly.
138 Requiring prompt reporting of cases of rape and incest to criminal
authorities, measured in terms of days if not hours, as the White House has
suggested, is to ignore study after study that has found precisely such cases among
the least often reported to the police. Yet late reporting, which should be
encouraged, becomes grounds to deny funding, and excludes altogether those who
fear, often with reason, to report at all. The pain and suffering of brutal victimization
and of an unwanted pregnancy are in no way affected by the speed of the initial
criminal report. A small victory, indeed.
President Bush vetoed the legislation on October 21, 1989. The House vote to
override was 231-191, short of the necessary two thirds majority. See 135 CONG. REC.
H7482-95 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989).
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